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The 2014e2015 Ebola crisis in West Africa has highlighted the practical limits of upholding human rights
and common ethical principles when applying emergency public-health measures. The role of medical
teams in the implementation of quarantine and isolation has been equivocal, particularly when such
measures are opposed by communities who are coerced by the temporary suspension of civil liberties. In
their encounters with Ebola victims, outreach teams face moral dilemmas, where the boundaries are
unclear between coercion, persuasion and appeals for self-sacriﬁce. For those teams, we propose a set of
practical recommendations aimed at respecting the autonomy of epidemic victims and easing tensions
within communities. We recognize that some of these recommendations are progressively achievable,
depending on the speciﬁc stage or setting of an outbreak. Yet with the increasing availability of exper-
imental treatments and research interventions, weighing patients' autonomy against the common good
will become an even more pressing ethical obligation.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
It is now commonplace to say that the 2014e2015 epidemic of
Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa has been ‘unprecedented’,
owing to its magnitude, societal impact, regional dimension and
international spread. The disarray of local health systems, the
mobility of populations, the shortcomings of global health in-
stitutions and the absence of an effective regional mechanism for
outbreak response are held as prominent reasons for the delayed
containment of the epidemic in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In
such exceptional circumstances, conventional public-health activ-
ities to control Ebola outbreaks have magniﬁed unresolved ethical
issues and exposed the complexity of tensions between individual
autonomy and the common good. Front-line responders striving to
implement urgent public-health measures have beenworking in an
unusually difﬁcult context, marked by the temporary suspension of
civil liberties, controversial quarantine measures, weak human-
rights protection, questionable public-health strategies and blur-
red responsibilities. These conditions have made encounters be-
tween relief workers and Ebola victims ethically problematic and
prone to generating moral distress (Ulrich, 2014). This essay willalain).
Ltd. This is an open access article uexamine how patients' autonomy has been sacriﬁced to the public-
health necessities imposed by the 2014e2015 Ebola epidemic.With
a focus on forcible isolation, we will develop three problematic
dimensions of epidemic-control activities. Firstly, we will argue
that socio-political accounts of the frequent resistance of pop-
ulations to public-health actions have left aside ethical perspectives
in general and the question of autonomy in particular. Secondly, we
will examine how coercive measures taken during theWest African
epidemic have failed to meet human rights or ethical standards and
how non-governmental actors have reacted to these measures.
Thirdly, we will compare the respective strengths of practical and
moral reasons that might justify facility isolation with those
generally put forward against quarantine. Finally, we will offer
recommendations to clarify and ease the position of non-state ac-
tors towards coercive measures used in times of major epidemics.2. Filovirus outbreaks: explanatory models of resistance and
violence
The public-health response to outbreaks of the Ebola and Mar-
burg viruses (members of the Filoviridae family, henceforth called
‘ﬁlovirus’) has essentially remained the same since the ﬁrst veriﬁed
occurrence of EVD in 1976. For biomedical experts, a number of
public-health measures are essential and generally seen as un-
controversial: centralized case isolation (i.e. the management ofnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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biosafety procedures), case ﬁnding (through active surveillance,
follow-up of rumors and contact tracing), safe burial rites, social
mobilization, health promotion and the reinforcement of standard
precautions. Other measures remain disputed, for example indi-
vidual or mass quarantine, border closures or social distancing.
Regardless of the scientiﬁc authority of public-health prescriptions,
collective reactions of fear, disbelief, rumor or hostility have his-
torically been encountered by many relief and scientiﬁc teams in
their approaches to communities affected by ﬁlovirus outbreaks.
This was already the case in 1995 when Ebola spread to Kikwit
(currently Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Garrett, 2001). In
2001e2002 during an outbreak of EVD in a remote location
straddling the border between Gabon and Congo, the reluctance of
villagers to collaborate with outbreak-investigation teams created
security conditions that forced international members to evacuate
the area twice (WHO, 2003). In 2003, health workers received
death threats and suffered acts of violence when Ebola broke out
again in the same rural setting of Congo (Formenty et al., 2003).
Prior to the arrival of researchers, four teachers accused of
spreading the disease were assassinated in the town of Kele. Rural
areas are not the only cases. Urban settings have also been the
theater of hostility and violence, notably during ﬁlovirus outbreaks
in Gulu (Uganda) in 2000e2001 (Hewlett and Hewlett, 2005) and
in Uige (Angola) in 2005 (Roddy et al., 2007).
Unsurprisingly West Africa has experienced the same sort of
reactions, whereby national and international teams tasked with
public-health activities have been facing recurrent and widespread
hostility from many affected communities. There are frequent re-
ports of patients in hiding or refusing to present to treatment fa-
cilities. In Sierra Leone, during the most recent period of enforced
lockdown, systematic home searches found that about one third of
all patients had previously not been identiﬁed by contact tracing
(Sahid, 2015). In Guinea, the frequency of incidents has been
monitored by Guinean authorities since November, 2014
(Reliefweb, 2015) by recording the weekly number of sub-
prefectures reporting reticences. Reticences (as opposed to the
more politically charged “resistance”) is a neutral qualiﬁer that
encompasses all instances of opposition to either contact tracing,
transfer to isolation, safe burials or other public-health in-
terventions (ACAPS, 2015a). Examples given in national weekly
reports include the refusal to be put in isolation, verbal violence,
vandalism, death threats, the stoning of cars or physical aggression
towards outreach teams. In Guinea, the geographical spread of
reticences culminated in January, 2015, with 32 of the 341 sub-
prefectures or urban communes reporting incidents. As of April,
2015 a few areas close to the capital city of Conakry remained
hostile to outreach teams. Local measures taken by the Guinean
authorities have generally focused on mass communication and
interventions by peers, religious leaders or traditional authorities.
In January 2015, the President of Guinea authorized the use of force
against those who oppose to Ebola control measures (Diallo, 2015).
The open epidemiological category of reticences is misleading, as it
conﬂates two morally distinct actions, i.e. the legitimate reluctance
of individuals to comply with extreme public-health measures and
genuine acts of violence. On top of minor daily incidents, a number
of extremely violent events have affected and delayed the work of
relief organizations. On 4 April, 2014 in Guinea, less than three
weeks after the conﬁrmation of the outbreak, mobs in the town of
Macenta threatened Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) teams, forcing
the suspension of all Ebola-control activities for one week. In
September 2014 in Womey (Forest region, Guinea) eight members
of a high-ranking delegation were murdered, including three
health ofﬁcials. The same month, Red Cross teams collecting dead
bodies were attacked in the mining town of Forecariah. In SierraLeone, similar incidents occurred in Koidu in October, 2014, leaving
two dead and residents under curfew (Ruble, 2014). The incident
followed an attempt by health ofﬁcials, to take an elderly woman to
an Ebola treatment center against the will of family members. In
Liberia, the township of West Point in Monrovia was the theater of
major incidents in August 2014 after mobs looted an Ebola clinic.
Soon after, clashes with security forces followed quarantine and
curfew orders, leaving many wounded and one dead from gunshot
wounds.
The political dimension of civil unrest that accompanies major
Ebola outbreaks is omnipresent and complex. In West Africa, op-
position to public health authorities has been interpreted as an
expression of the social divisions left successively by the coloni-
zation, civil wars, and post-conﬂict development policies. In Guinea
for example, the frequent resistance to Ebola-response activities
reﬂects both historical and contemporary factors, themselves
inﬂuenced by national and international circumstances. In the
Forest region, where the Ebola epidemic started, long-lasting
secular conﬂicts still divide communities and generate mistrust
against national authorities (Anoko, 2015). In addition, memories of
coercive public healthmeasures during the colonial era, mixedwith
resentment about past international clinical trials entertain rumors
of an intentional origin of the disease (ACAPS, 2015a). Putting the
epidemic in a broader international context, Wilkinson and Leach
(2015) see local resistances to epidemic response as a conse-
quence of the structural violence and inequalities that prevail in
post-colonial Africa, exacerbated by the inevitable presence of
foreign or international agencies working in support of national
authorities. Examining international biomedical perspectives,
Leach and Hewlett (2010) have shown how a ‘global outbreak’
narrative pervades health policies and their interpretation of
epidemic events. This narrative privileges scientiﬁc authority over
local knowledge and calls for external remediation, ignoring how
popular knowledge can integrate with biomedical science. In a
narrow interpretation, the global outbreak narrative shifts the
blame to victims, variably accused of medical superstitions, unsafe
burials, consumption of infectious wild game, or the shunning of
Ebola treatment centers.
Aside from political contexts, medical anthropology provides
another explanatory framework. With their pioneering ﬁeld work
in Uganda (Hewlett and Hewlett, 2008), Congo (Formenty et al.,
2003; Hewlett et al., 2005) and Gabon (Hewlett and Hewlett,
2008), anthropologists have documented how hostile reactions to
public-health measures reﬂect a divide between biomedical rep-
resentations of EVD and other cultural models prevailing in African
societies. For example, traditional and biomedical communities
would typically diverge in their interpretations of disease, conta-
gion and healing, in theway they conduct protective rituals, in their
handling of the deceased during burial rites, or in their under-
standing of risk groups and sources of the disease. Anthropological
approaches are essential to guide the response to ﬁlovirus epi-
demics through community engagement (Epelboin, 2015; Marais
et al., 2015), mediation (Anoko, 2015) and ﬂexibility in the appli-
cation of biomedical models (Chandler et al., 2015). At the same
time, anthropological perspectives are incomplete and run the risk
of patronizing interpretations if cultural aspects of resistances are
taken at face value. Cultural explanations alone discount the ca-
pacity for autonomous decision-making, expected from anyone
exposed to the consequences of contagion and regardless of na-
tional or cultural afﬁliations. In other words, reactions of disbelief
or opposition to public-health measures are rational and universal
and would likely be felt by many of us facing the prospect of
quarantine, isolation, social ostracism, suffering and possible death.
Practically, communities are keen to incorporate traditional and
biomedical models in a form of medical pluralism compatible with
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work establishes how rural or urban communities can naturally
adjust public health necessities to their material and social con-
straints. For example, Richards et al. (2015) describe the rural set-
tlement of Fogbo in Sierra Leone, and the complexity of social
factors of transmission of EVD in a community sustaining itself
through family help, kinship, migration, and local markets. In
Liberia, Abramowitz et al. (2015) analyze how urban communities
managed to organize themselves to contain the outbreak, when left
on their ownwithout outside assistance. Thus, local knowledge can
bring about efﬁcient survival strategies, particularly when the state
and international response are failing. When liberty-restricting
measures are imposed in this context, they are bound to exacer-
bate pre-existing tensions, whereas trustworthiness and reci-
procity should be put forward instead. Trust in local institutions
(Richards et al., 2015) and hospitals (Brown and Kelly, 2014) are
important for communities to seek help for EVD. Focus-group
discussions conducted in Monrovia in November, 2014 (Kutalek
et al., 2015) revealed additional concerns. Local participants rejec-
ted an incentive scheme intended to increase the reporting of
suspected cases and pointed out speciﬁc problems compromising
the credibility of public-health actions, e.g. food shortages for
families in quarantine, communication between patients and their
families, basic health services, psychosocial support for affected
families and the inclusion of Ebola survivors in the teams of active
case-ﬁnders and contact-tracers.
3. Quarantine and restrictions of freedom
Around JulyeAugust, 2014, four countries (Guinea, Liberia,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone) in an attempt to contain the Ebola
epidemic issued emergency presidential declarations and a
comprehensive list of compulsory measures. The range of legal
prescriptions varied from country to country, drawing from the
following categories of measures: closures of public places,
compulsory leave, cordon sanitaire, curfews, sanitation, isolation,
price control, quarantine, screening, surveillance, testing, travel
restrictions and treatment (Hodge et al., 2014). Mali and Senegal e
other African countries that faced the threat of Ebola propagatione
also resorted to active surveillance, quarantine and isolation.
At the very least, coercive public-health measures need to be
based on compelling scientiﬁc evidence and framed in clear and
consistent legal and ethical principles (Rothstein, 2015a). The
following analysis shows that this does not seem to have been the
case during Ebola epidemics, particularly in West Africa. Quaran-
tine has so far been the most disputed issue among other public-
health measures prescribed and enforced by public authorities. In
contrast, isolation has usually been granted as an absolute necessity
in the face of acute epidemics of highly lethal communicable dis-
eases, and it has therefore been seen as ethically unproblematic. For
example, commenting on the SARS epidemic, Wynia (2007)
claimed that the isolation of sick patients ‘tends not to provoke
much concern’, compared to the quarantine of healthy people. To
the contrary, we contend that the isolation of EVD patients raises
different but not less concerning questions than other liberty-
restricting measures.
3.1. Human Rights Law
The remit of liberty-restricting measures in response to public-
health emergencies can be analyzed from at least three different
angles, i.e. national laws, the human rights doctrine (embodied in
International Human Rights Law) and ethics. The enforcement of
laws and treaties, including International Human Rights Law
(IHRL), is the responsibility of States. As an element of IHRL, the UNSiracusa Principles (United Nations, 1985) spell out criteria for
suspending civil and political rights in case of public emergencies.
These include threats to public-health, as speciﬁed in Article 25:
“Public health may be invoked as a ground for limiting certain
rights in order to allow a state to take measures dealing with a
serious threat to the health of the population or individual
members of the population. Thesemeasuresmust be speciﬁcally
aimed at preventing disease or injury or providing care for the
sick and injured.”
According to the Siracusa principles, restrictions to civil liberties
should meet the criteria of being (i) provided for and carried out in
accordance with the law, (ii) in the interests of a legitimate objec-
tive of general good, (iii) strictly necessary in a democratic society
to achieve the objective, (iv) the least intrusive and restrictive
means available to reach the same objective, (v) based on scientiﬁc
evidence, and (vi) not imposed arbitrarily or in a discriminatory
manner (WHO, 2007). Furthermore, exceptional measures should
be of limited duration and subject to review and appeal (Rothstein
et al., 2003). In this context it is important to specify the roles and
responsibilities of international and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Non-governmental agencies that simultaneously provide the
expertise, materials and extra human capacity needed to contain an
epidemic are inevitably at risk of misperceptions about their role in
the implementation of restrictive measures. This could ostensibly
be the case, for example, when protection by the police is sought to
reach victims or when security forces themselves need training in
or protection from biohazards. Regardless of the relevance of co-
ercive measures imposed by national states of emergency, non-
governmental medical agencies have no role or legitimacy in
enforcing public-health measures. They are bound to respect na-
tional laws, but they cannot possibly be held accountable for the
enforcement of public-health law. Neither international humani-
tarian law nor common ethical principles would justify such
powers. In addition, the fact that none of the emergency public
health laws have been declared by way of proclamation (Karimova,
2015) byWest African countries could invalidate the derogations to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that they
represent.
3.2. Ethical pragmatism
While lacking the force of law, public-health ethics recognize
the necessity that some collective actions should outweigh indi-
vidual autonomy. Ethicists (Presidential Commission for the Study
of Bioethical Issues, 2015; Rothstein, 2015b) have reached very
similar conclusions to the Siracusa principles, by enunciating
ethical principles governing quarantine and other restrictive mea-
sures during public-health emergencies. These ethical principles
can be summarized as public necessity, demonstrated effectiveness
and scientiﬁc rationale, proportionality and least infringement,
reciprocity, justice and fairness. The same or similar principles
derive from several public health ethics frameworks, indicating on
what conditions the common good could outweigh individual au-
tonomy in case of public health necessity (reviewed in Bensimon
and Upshur, 2007). As recent epidemic crises have shown (HIV/
AIDS, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis, SARS and pandemic inﬂu-
enza), coercive measures are highly contextual and always
controversial. The Ebola crisis has precisely exposed the limits of
established ethics frameworks, in their contextual and pragmatic
applications. Ethical principles have remained at best distant dec-
larations of intent, and ethics debates have largely been side-
stepped in programmatic decisions. Reﬂecting on quarantine and
isolation from different perspectives, the following considerations
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suasions of public health meet individual autonomy.
3.3. Compelling evidence?
With their rapid developments, inﬂuenza pandemics (MacPhail,
2014) and the SARS epidemic of 2003 are cases in point for
contemporary debates about quarantine. In the case of SARS, the
effectiveness of quarantine e compared to isolation alone e is still
debated (Day et al., 2006; Barbisch et al., 2015), and the strength of
available scientiﬁc evidence depends on variable methodological or
statistical assumptions (Bondy et al., 2009). Ethicists (Bensimon
and Upshur, 2007) have emphasized the contingent nature of sci-
entiﬁc evidence and the inherent risk of deriving hasty or deﬁnitive
decisions about quarantine from limited scientiﬁc information.
Semantic precision is also important. At ﬁrst glance, deﬁnitions are
clear (Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues,
2015). Quarantine is the “separation of persons exposed to but
not exhibiting symptoms of a communicable disease”. Isolation is
the “separation of those infected with or exhibiting symptoms of a
communicable disease”. Still, we are left to deﬁne (i) what “sepa-
ration” means practically, (ii) what kind of symptoms count, and
(iii) what type of exposure counts. Furthermore, separation can be
forcible or voluntary and entail varying degrees of social distancing.
Persons infected with SARS or inﬂuenza shed viruses before
becoming symptomatic. This is unlike the case of EVD, where
persons infected with current ﬁlovirus strains are not contagious
until they display symptoms of the illness (Racaniello, 2014). The
difference is important for both practical and moral reasons. The
quarantine of asymptomatic SARS and inﬂuenza contacts could
plausibly limit the odds of silent transmission in a community. In
the sense of being non-discriminatory, it is a genuine public-health
measure. The quarantine of asymptomatic Ebola contacts does not
fulﬁll the same epidemiological rationale. Instead of primarily
limiting viral spread, Ebola quarantine is a measure to control the
movement of people deemed untrustworthy for reporting their
symptoms. It is thereforemore open to discrimination and arbitrary
enforcement.
It is simply plausible that the voluntary or compulsory quar-
antine of household contacts may play a role in the rapid
containment of ﬁlovirus outbreaks detected at their very early
stage. In Nigeria (Grigg et al., 2015) and Mali (Diallo and Felix,
2014), index cases could be identiﬁed rapidly in urban settings,
and quarantine measures were applied to all traceable contacts. In
Nigeria group quarantine was also imposed upon a minority of
contacts posing particular risks of further transmission due to their
occupations or home environments. As for mass quarantine (cordon
sanitaire), it was probably ineffective in Kikwit in 1995 (Heymann,
2014), although this claim has also been questioned (Garrett, 2014).
3.4. Quarantine here and abroad
For persons exposed to Ebola, the 2014 interim US guidance
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014) provided some
clarity by distinguishing between “active and direct monitoring”,
“controlled movement”, “exclusion from public places” and
“exclusion from the workplace”. The same document gives clear
deﬁnitions of risk categories, clinical criteria and derived public-
health actions. It addresses the case of individual persons
exposed to Ebola but remains silent about collective or mass
actions.
Forcible quarantine measures implemented in West African
countries are qualitatively different from public-health actions
considered in the US public-health guidance. They fall in a
normative vacuum of international guidance and certainly lackcompelling scientiﬁc evidence. Signiﬁcantly, in West Africa the
forcible quarantine of entire Ebola-exposed families or commu-
nities has dramatic consequences. Their stigmatization is one
aspect. Furthermore, the temporary loss of livelihoods and basic
commodities makes quarantine practically unsustainable for poor
families already taxed by the loss of relatives (Kutalek et al., 2015;
ACAPS, 2015b). The distribution of food supplies to quarantined
households has remained a marginal solution (ACAPS, 2015b).
Anecdotal evidence (Bianchi, 2015) indicates that some patients
admitted to isolation wards conceal their exact address as a way to
protect their families from the dire consequences of quarantine.
Issued at the end of July, 2014, the West African emergency
declarations did not cause much international outcry. It is troubling
that forcible quarantine and isolation started to elicit reactions in
Western countries only late in October, 2014, when expatriate
workers returning to the US became themselves subject to liberty-
restricting measures imposed by their own state jurisdictions. In
the USA, the much publicized case of Ms. Kaci Hickox, a MSF
volunteer returning from Sierra Leone, unfolded successively as
episodes of forcible isolation, home quarantine and controlled
displacements (Miles, 2015). The controversy had multiple di-
mensions, i.e. human rights issues, the relevance of imposed re-
strictions from a public-health perspective, doubts about the
existence of symptoms, inconsistencies between US federal, state
or military prescriptions and the relative discomfort of being
detained in makeshift conditions of isolation. As a trained MSF
Ebola nurse, Ms. Hickox denied any unprotected exposure to the
virus and objected to any restriction of movement which put her at
odds with state authorities. In support to her views, scholars
(Drazen et al., 2014; Koenig, 2015) and others (MSF, 2014) have put
forward a number of arguments against the forcible quarantine of
healthy volunteers returning from epidemic-hit countries, e.g. the
fragmentation of public-health agencies, the inconsistencies of
public-health laws between states, practical obstacles to the
implementation of coercive measures, solidarity with and respect
of aid workers, evidence that active monitoring and voluntary
distancing are sufﬁcient public-health measures and deterring the
enrollment of other volunteer workers because of unnecessarily
restrictive measures.
Thus legal, ethical and pragmatic reasons for rejecting EVD
quarantine are partly different for West Africa and industrialized
countries. Regardless, it would be inconsistent for international
organizations to oppose quarantine orders in the USA while at the
same time remaining silent on forcible quarantine in West Africa.
Except perhaps for the early stages of Ebola epidemics, it appears
that collective and forcible quarantine actions have failed on the
grounds of public necessity, demonstrated effectiveness and sci-
entiﬁc rationale. Concerning proportionality, least infringement,
reciprocity, due process and the ability to lodge legal appeals,
quarantine for EVD does not meet ethical and human-rights stan-
dards either in a context of national disaster and weak institutions.
4. Facility isolation: an onerous public-health measure
So far we have examined the shortcomings of the compulsory
quarantine of EVD-patient contacts. Likewise, it is legitimate to
next ask how the isolation of symptomatic patients meets the
conditions imposed by international human-right law and ethics,
including compelling scientiﬁc evidence. Two related questions
await empirical research with survivors or the families of victims.
To what extent does facility isolation reﬂect free choice, persuasion
or some sort of coercion imposed by emergency circumstances or
by the absence of any alternative option? What proportion of in-
dividuals would be ready to sacriﬁce themselves for the sake of the
common good by entering isolation units for the sole reason of
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These two questions can be approached together by preliminary
considerations about the current rationale for isolation and its
consequences.
4.1. The meaning of isolation
There is historical and theoretical evidence that the isolation of
cases is one of the most essential measures to contain EVD (Pandey
et al., 2014), together with safe burial practices and contact tracing.
Yet the consequences of isolation are often shrouded by emergency
considerations. Even more than with quarantine, individuals sub-
jected to facility isolation experience extraordinary limitations to
their autonomy, particularly in the circumstances of mass catas-
trophes. Their distress is aggravated by a sudden and sometimes
deﬁnitive separation from relatives or by the frequent destruction
of their few belongings for disinfection. Once in isolation, patients
are allegedly free to leave, although the “escape” of patients has
occasionally created difﬁcult situations, to which relief teams have
felt obliged to react forcefully (Fink, 2015). More recently in Sierra
Leone, “escapees” have been publicly named and shamed by na-
tional authorities (Mac Johnson and Larson, 2015). In typical Ebola
management facilities (also called Ebola Treatment Centers or
Units) isolation has at least four dimensions: physical, cognitive,
affective and spiritual. To avoid any risk of physical contact with
patients' bodies or ﬂuids, mainstream standards of protective
equipment call for full body coverage for attending professionals.
As a consequence, cultural or linguistic barriers are compounded by
additional obstacles to verbal and facial communication and by the
rapid rotation of care takers exposed to hyperthermia (Sprecher
et al., 2015). With these conditions, patients are inevitably left in
a degree of cognitive isolation by being limited in their capacity to
know about their condition, their prognosis and the state of their
families. As the epidemic became more manageable in West Africa,
MSF and other organizations have introduced architectural ad-
justments to facilitate contact between patients in isolation and
relatives, survivors or even religious leaders. Unfortunately,
cognitive, affective and spiritual isolation remain difﬁcult to alle-
viate for the most incapacitated cases, particularly when they are
close to death. A most distressing situation experienced by health
personnel has been the isolation of children, many of whom have
been orphaned by their parents' death from EVD (Zellmann, 2015;
Maron, 2015). Contrary to earlier practices, current isolation pro-
tocols fail to account for different degrees of exposure in isolation
zones, making the presence of relatives at the bedside generally
impossible.
4.2. Isolation paradigms
The model of isolation in centralized facilities equipped with
maximal biosecurity has become a norm for pragmatic and stafﬁng
reasons. From a pure public-health perspective, there is no doubt
that facility isolation in ‘treatment beds’ had a major impact on the
reduction of disease transmission in West Africa (Kucharski et al.,
2015a). This is not to say that it has always been an absolute ne-
cessity, in particular where the social cost could have outweighed
direct public health gains. Based on the epidemic parameters of
2014, projections (Merler et al., 2015) suggest that epidemic control
could be achieved, together with other critical measures, when 70%
of the cases become isolated either in Ebola treatment units, at
home or in community settings. Smaller community care centers
(CCCs) would increase the acceptance of isolation. In theory, in
terms of epidemic control CCCs could be as effective as Ebola
treatment units (Witty et al., 2014; Washington and Meltzer, 2015),
but they require equally strict infection-control procedures(Kucharski et al., 2015b).
Home-based isolation was used in previous ﬁlovirus epidemics
to offer alternative options to those unwilling to be hospitalized
(Kersti€ens and Matthys, 1999; Formenty et al., 2003; Roddy et al.,
2007). For example, MSF has guidelines for “home-based support
and risk reduction”, a procedure where a single caregiver is allowed
to provide minimal care after receiving training, protective equip-
ment and sanitary supplies (Sterk, 2008). A review of epidemio-
logical observations in past ﬁlovirus outbreaks indicates that family
attendants sharing a room with patients are at much lower risk of
contamination if they are not involved in direct nursing care
(Shears and O'Dempsey, 2015). One can thus assume that minimal
care (e.g. handling food and drink) can safely be offered at home
under reduced protective clothing and after appropriate training of
designated attendants. Thus, depending on the circumstances or
phases of an EVD outbreak, facility isolation does not necessarily
represent the only option or is the least intrusive and restrictive
means available. While we are still unsure about how much risk-
reduction other models might afford, the pragmatic limits of
centralized facility isolation were reached in the summer of 2014
during the peak of urban transmission of Ebola in Monrovia. When
response teams became overwhelmed, clear criteria for prioritizing
access to facility admissions were inexistent, and urban commu-
nities were ready to become self-reliant in managing essential
outbreak-control activities (Abramowitz et al., 2015).
For EVD patients, facility isolation thus represents the most
onerous among currently prescribed public-health measures. It is
therefore not surprising that the prospect of forcible isolation has
contributed to fears and hostility frommany Ebola victims towards
outreach teams.
5. Reaching out to Ebola patients: an ethical quagmire
5.1. Implicit and explicit reasons for isolation
Obviously from a medical perspective, the fact that case-
isolation is imposed by law does not imply that the patients' au-
tonomy should be disregarded. Unless outreach teams represent
public-health or law-enforcement authorities, the use of overt
coercion would be illegal and in any case ethically problematic for
health professionals. This is even more so for foreign humanitarian
workers, who have neither the legal authority nor an international
mandate to enforce public-health measures. It is also doubtful
whether patients would have the possibility of legal recourse to
oppose isolation orders in the event of a major Ebola epidemic
outbreak inWestern Africa. Leaving aside the legality and relevance
of coercive measures, let us now assume for a moment that isola-
tion is largely voluntary with patients either presenting sponta-
neously at the gates of treatment units or being willingly
transferred from home after being notiﬁed they were a suspected
case. To respect patients' dignity, their choices need to be informed
by genuine reasons for isolation. These reasons are not always
made explicit, consistent or clear by the health community.
As discussed earlier, a ﬁrst and prominent reason to follow
measures of isolation is to limit contagion and offer the material
possibilities of being cared for at a safe distance from unprotected
relatives. While the argument is compelling from a public-health
perspective, patients are ultimately asked to sacriﬁce themselves
for the common good or the safety of their families.
A less altruistic but a more convincing reason to enter isolation
would be to receive better care and to improve one's chances of
survival. This argument has been increasingly emphasized in
health-promotion messages. In reality there is little evidence in
claiming that the current clinical management in dedicated isola-
tion units consistently and signiﬁcantly guarantees better chances
Box 1
Practical ethical guidance to outreach teams.
Trustworthiness
C Veracity: openness about the exact reasons e with their
burdens and benefits e for isolation
C Clarity of roles: separation from law enforcement
authorities
C The inclusion of Ebola survivors in outreach teams
Reciprocity
C Material and psychological support for families
C The provision of basic health services
Proportionality and least infringement
C The offering of genuine choices: possible alternatives to
facility isolation, including home-based care
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biological parameters certainly makes a difference in terms of
survival (Lyon et al., 2014), but local capacities for such care are still
inconsistent and sparse. However deplorable, this reality should be
disclosed without ambiguity to all persons advised to seek care in
isolation facilities. One could argue that the combined conditions of
emergency and unrest would justify some degree of deception to
achieve overarching public-health goals and public safety. Such a
position would be in any case ethically problematic e and even
more questionable in the futureewith the increasing availability of
experimental interventions. The latter will introduce the added
dimension of consent to research in this difﬁcult context and make
the obligation of veracity toward patients and communities the
more pressing. Telling the truth about limited treatment capacities
does not mean relinquishing hope. In this regard, the role of sur-
vivors as witnesses and trusted sources of information about the
reality of isolation (USAID, 2015) is fundamental.
Aside from better clinical care and reduced transmission, there
are still other reasons for patients to opt for facility isolation, for
example the pressure applied by an unsupportive or hostile commu-
nity. Infrequently, the mental capacity of patients could be affected
by the disease. This would be an exceptionally difﬁcult situation, if
it put attendants and medical personnel at increased risk. It would
however be inappropriate to assume that most Ebola patients
suffer from impaired cognition, even at an advanced stage of the
disease. Instead, they should primarily be seen as autonomous
persons, capable of choice, but placed in a position of vulnerability
by the severity of the disease, the circumstances and, sometimes,
by the intimidating deployment of protective paraphernalia.
5.2. Ethics principles translated in action
We now come back to the critical and ethically problematic
encounter, which is central to this paper. Contact tracers and case
ﬁnders have testiﬁed on how they often found themselves facing
moral dilemmas, when public-health actions to limit contagion
conﬂicted with their obligation to respect patients' autonomy and
dignity. What remained available to them was the force of
persuasion and appeals to self-sacriﬁce, making it difﬁcult to ﬁnd
the appropriate balance between persuasion and subtle coercion,
or between veracity and deception. From what precedes, and
combining ethical principles with pragmatic observations, we
propose six practical recommendations for medical outreach teams
to avoid the pitfalls of coercion when approaching suspected EVD
cases (Box 1). These recommendations all express moral deference
for individual autonomy and dignity, while speciﬁc recommenda-
tions translate obligations of trustworthiness, reciprocity, and
proportionality. These moral obligations seem to us the most
essential ones, as they connect with the expectations of affected
communities. They are likely to reinforce trust and ease tensions,
and they would probably contribute to reducing community
transmission by overcoming hostility, miscommunication and the
hiding of victims (Meltzer et al., 2014). While veracity and clarity of
roles are unconditional, other actions are progressively achievable,
depending on the context. For example, the acute phase of the
disaster-response might initially justify inﬂexible procedures with
little space for such considerations as the provision of basic health
services or the follow-up of some Ebola patients at home. Offering
all possible choices, including alternatives to facility isolationmight
represent a trade-off between infection control and autonomy. We
believe that this trade-off is ethically sound, and practically
manageable through sensible processes of community involve-
ment. In any case, the conduct of therapeutic trials in treatment
centers cannot be ethically defensible as long as patients have not
freely consented to facility isolation.6. Conclusions
During the West African Ebola epidemic, the practical limits of
upholding human rights and ethical principles have been put to the
test for medical teams tasked with the application of public-health
measures. Perhaps more than others, members of outreach teams
have faced practical and moral issues when tasked with identifying
cases in communities and transporting them to centralized isola-
tion facilities. This is not only due to the constant threat of
contamination but also to the concurrent circumstances imposed
by (i) states of emergency accompanied by forcible public-health
prescriptions and (ii) the frequently encountered hostility of
affected communities.
In this essay we have discussed how both quarantine and
isolation enforced in West Africa after declarations of states of
emergency became equally problematic in the light of human
rights and ethical perspectives. They deserve the same public
scrutiny as the isolated cases of coercion seen in industrialized
countries with home-coming humanitarian professionals. Forceful
quarantine has probably contributed little to curbing the epidemic.
On the other hand, facility isolation has been imposed by a clearer
public-health rationale but also at some moral cost and in the
absence of consistent ethical guidance. We are unsure if facility
isolation was an absolute and constant necessity in the course of
the epidemic. The prospect of being kept in isolation may at times
have created deterrence in communities and contributed to the
perpetuation of the epidemic. We would thus propose a series of
pragmatic recommendations aimed at easing tensions between
relief workers and communities while respecting the autonomy of
the victims of epidemic disasters. We recognize that some of these
recommendations are progressively achievable, depending on the
speciﬁc stage or setting of an outbreak. At the same time, as cir-
cumstances evolve, respect for patients' choices should prevail.
With the prospect of new therapeutic or preventive interventions,
new designs of containment techniques or parallel actions to sup-
port health systems, the response to ﬁlovirus outbreaks might be
different in the future. Still, complex ethical challenges will inevi-
tably be encountered when the context imposes the co-existence of
disputed public-health actions, coercive laws and the carrying out
of research. Disastrous circumstances can happen with any public
P. Calain, M. Poncin / Social Science & Medicine 147 (2015) 126e133132health event of national or international concern. Our recommen-
dations are therefore generic, beyond the speciﬁc case of ﬁlovirus
epidemics.
According to a dominant worldview, the West African situation
is a regional exception explained by political and socio-cultural
circumstances, dysfunctional health systems and weak public in-
stitutions. We to the contrary see it more as an exemplary and
universal case, anticipating what would happen when epidemic
disasters impose measures that are unpopular and onerous to civil
liberties and communal values. Taken alone, political or socio-
cultural explanations tend to play down the autonomy of affected
individuals and reduce their lack of compliance with public-health
measures to an African singularity. An ethics analysis opens broader
perspectives, recognizing the importance of autonomy and the
failure of authoritarian approaches to outbreak control.
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